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COUNTERCLAIMS, THE WELL-PLEADED
COMPLAINT, AND FEDERAL WRISDICTION
Christopher A. Cotropia*

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court recently decided, in Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Circulation Systems, Inc., that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over a case could not rest solely on a counterclaim for patent
infringement. 1 This decision represented a significant departure from
over ten years of established Federal Circuit patent law jurisprudence
confirming that even if the only patent claim present in a case was a
counterclaim, the Federal Circuit still had appellate jurisdiction. 2 Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over such cases made sense, considering that the
Federal Circuit was created by Congress to be the exclusive venue for
patent appeals. 3 In reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes,

• Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. Thanks and appreciation
to Michael Collins, Jonathan Nash, Rafael Pardo, and Ed Sherman for their helpful comments and
suggestions regarding earlier drafts of this article. Additional thanks to my research assistant Andrea
Caron. Special thanks, as always, to Dawn-Marie Bey.
I. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
2. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 742
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
3. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
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many commentators have discussed this change in the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction and its effects on patent law. 4
Notably, none of these commentators have discussed the
fundamental holding at the core of the Court's decision-that federal
law counterclaims cannot form the sole basis for federal question
jurisdiction. 5 This rule of law, arguably, is a natural application of the
already established well-pleaded complaint rule. However, the Holmes
decision's revisiting of how one determines "arising under" jurisdiction
presents a much needed opportunity to reexamine how the contours of
federal question jurisdiction is determined. Specifically, the wellpleaded complaint rule and its application to federal law counterclaims,
which lay at the base of the Holmes decision, should be reconsidered.
Such a discussion is needed, considering that regional circuit courts and
district courts, before and after Holmes, have had to determine the
proper scope of federal question jurisdiction in cases where the only
federal law claim is presented in a counterclaim. 6 Even a state supreme
court, after Holmes, has discussed the ramifications of the well-pleaded
complaint rule as applied to counterclaims and the interrelationship
between federal and state jurisdiction over a federal claim. 7
The well-pleaded complaint rule's interaction with counterclaims
has implications far beyond the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over patent
cases discussed by the Supreme Court in Holmes. The fact that
4. See, e.g., C.J. Alice Chen, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 141 (2003); Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and
Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003); Molly Mosley-Goren,
Jurisdictional Gerrymandering? Responding to Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,
36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. I (2002); Janice M. Mueller, "Interpretive Necromancy" or Prudent
Patent Policy? The Supreme Court's "Arising Under" Blunder in Holmes Group v. Vornado, J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 57 (2002); Elizabeth I. Rogers, The Phoenix Precedents: The
Unexpected Rebirth of Regional Circuit Jurisdiction Over Patent Appeals and the Need for a
Considered Congressional Response, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 411 (2003); Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee to Study Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 12 FED. CIR. B.
J. 713 (2003); Scott Amy, Note, Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: How Holmes
Alters the Landscape of Patent Cases on Appeal, 38 GA. L. REV. 429 (2003); Christian A. Fox,
Comment, On Your Mark, Get Set, Go! A New Race to the Courthouse Sponsored by Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 2003 BYU L. REV. 331 (2003); Timothy E.
Grimsrud, Comment, Holmes and the Erosion of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Over Patent
Claims, 87 MINN. L. REV. 2133 (2003); Gentry Crook McLean, Note, Vornado Hits the Midwest:
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction in Patent and Antitrust Cases after Holmes v. Vornado, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1091 (2004).
5. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 831.
6. See, e.g., Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 326 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2003); Integra Bank., N.A. v.
Greer, No. IP 4:02-CV-244 B/H, 2003 WL 21544260 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2003).
7. Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 788 (Ind. 2002).
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counterclaims cannot form an independent basis for federal question
jurisdiction creates the following effects: First, the well-pleaded
complaint rule prevents federal law counterclaims from establishing
original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. While federal law may
create the cause of action set forth in a counterclaim, such a
counterclaim does not meet the "arising under" test because it falls
outside the well-pleaded complaint. A district court cannot use a federal
law counterclaim as a jurisdictional hook. Second, the well-pleaded
complaint rule does not allow federal law counterclaims to make a state
case removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A district court's original
jurisdiction defines its removal jurisdiction, and, just as a federal law
counterclaim cannot create original federal question jurisdiction, it
cannot form the basis for removal jurisdiction. Finally, the well-pleaded
complaint rule's impact on counterclaims limits some areas of exclusive
federal jurisdiction. This is specifically the case where Congress defined
exclusive jurisdiction to be the same as a federal court's "arising under"
jurisdiction. A perfect example of such a definition is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a), defining the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts over
patent and copyright cases. Patent and copyright counterclaims do not
"aris[e] under" federal law, and therefore fall outside exclusive federal
jurisdiction.
The implications of the well-pleaded complaint rule as applied to
federal law counterclaims are many. By excluding federal law
counterclaims, the well-pleaded complaint rule frustrates the purposes
behind federal question jurisdiction. The rule hampers the uniformity
furthered by federal question jurisdiction by creating situations where
federal questions may be stuck in state courts--outside of the federal
system. The legitimate interests of the parties to avail themselves of a
federal forum are also upset. Both plaintiffs and defendants, under
certain circumstances, may have legitimate reasons to seek the expertise
of a federal court to adjudicate a federal law counterclaim. The rule as
applied to counterclaims also leads to inefficiencies, particularly where
the rule prompts forum shopping and gamesmanship on the part of
plaintiffs and defendants.
·
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I of the Article begins by
laying the statutory and constitutional foundation of "arising under"
jurisdiction. The current connection between "arising under" jurisdiction
and federal question jurisdiction is discussed. Part I also fully sets forth
the well-pleaded complaint rule, and discusses removal jurisdiction,
which is governed by the concept of "arising under" jurisdiction. As
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necessary background to understanding the Court's reasoning in Holmes
and why the case prompts a general discussion on federal jurisdiction
implications, Part I concludes by defining a district court's jurisdiction
over patent cases, the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases, and how these two areas of jurisdiction fit within the broader
scheme of federal question jurisdiction. Part II of the Article focuses on
the Court's decision in Holmes and the basic holding of the case. The
immediate ramifications of the Holmes decision on the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction are briefly discussed. Part II concludes by
discussing what the Supreme Court said about the well-pleaded
complaint rule in general in the Holmes decision.
Part III of the Article discusses the implication of the well-pleaded
complaint rule on a federal court's original jurisdiction, removal
jurisdiction, and exclusive federal jurisdiction over a federal law
counterclaim. Part IV evaluates the policy implications of the wellpleaded complaint rule as applied to counterclaims. The rule's ability to
frustrate the purposes behind federal question jurisdiction is discussed.
In addition, how the rule can disturb a plaintiffs or defendant's
legitimate interests and introduce inefficiency into the judicial process
are examined. Part V of the Article discusses potential statutory
solutions-ways in which the detrimental effects of the well-pleaded
complaint rule may be prevented. As a final note, the Article suggests
that the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over patent cases be
untied from federal district courts' "arising under" jurisdiction to stop
decisions unique to this specialized appellate court from visiting general
questions of federal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
I.

A.

"ARISING UNDER" JURISDICTION

Constitutional and Statutory Basis for "Arising Under" Jurisdiction

The phrase "arising under" originated from Article III of the
Constitution, defining the jurisdiction of the federal court system. 8 The
Supreme Court interpreted this phrase, as it appears in Article III, to
extend the constitutional grant of federal judiciary power to every case
where federal law potentially forms an ingredient of a claim. 9 Article III
8. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority ... " U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. I (emphasis added).
9. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-27 (1824).
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allowed "[t]he mere existence of a latent federal 'ingredient' that might
in theory be dispositive of the outcome of a case ... to bring the entire
case, including ancillary nonfederal issues, within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts." 10 An implementing statute is needed, however, for lower
federal courts to exercise the powers conferred by Article III. 11 With
such an implementing statute, lower federal courts could enjoy some or
all of the constitutional "arising under" grant of jurisdiction. 12
Such an implementing statute is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
stating that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 13 While § 1331 uses the same "arising under" language as
Article III, the Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory grant of
judicial power as defining a considerably narrower scope of jurisdiction
than that provided by the Constitution: 14 "Art[icle] III 'arising under'
jurisdiction is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under§ 1331." 15
In order to define this narrower scope, the Supreme Court has defined a
test to determine whether a case falls within the "arising under"
jurisdiction, otherwise known as the federal question jurisdiction,
defined by § 1331.
The test for determining "arising under" jurisdiction under § 1331
has both a procedural and substantive component. 16 The procedural
component consists of an "analytical filter" 17 termed the "well-pleaded
complaint rule." 18 "The first step dictates [where, i.e., in which pleading
or paper] the jurisdiction-conferring federal question must appear .... " 19
10. John 8. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When Does
What 'Arise Under' Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1832-33 (1998) (citing Osborn, 22 U.S.
at 823); see also William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise
"Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 890-91 (1967).
11. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823.
12. Id.; see also Cohen, supra note I 0, at 891.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (emphasis added).
14. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. I, 8 n.8 (1983);

see also Cohen, supra note 10, at 891 (noting that "the statutory grant has been conceded to vest in
the federal courts less than the scope of federal question jurisdiction which Congress might vest.");
Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 160-63
(1953).
15. Verlinden 8.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983); see also Merrell Dow
Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986).
16. Oakley, supra note I 0, at 1834.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127 (1974) (per
curiam).
19. Oakley, supra note 10, at 1834; see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149, 152 (1908).
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The well-pleaded complaint rule defines the universe in which "arising
under" jurisdiction can be found.2°
The substantive component looks at the substance of those claims
that can be seen through the well-pleaded complaint filter and
determines if any of those claims found with that filter truly "aris[ e]
under" federal law. 21 Two types of federal claims qualify as
substantively "arising under" federal jurisdiction. 22 The first types of
claims to qualify are those where federal law creates the cause of
action. 23 These claims are typically causes of action created by federal
statute. 24 The second types of claims to qualify are those where "'it
appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims. "'25
Jurisdiction over these claims is predicated on the fact that "the mere
presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not
automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction"-the federal issue
must be both "substantial" and "necessary."26
This Article will focus on the initial, procedural step of determining
whether there is "arising under" jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331. 27 The
"analytical filter," or lens, used to define the universe of claims that may
be considered is termed the "well-pleaded complaint."28 The Supreme
Court articulates the well-pleaded complaint rule as follows:
[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or
treaty of the United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional statute, ...
must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's
statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by

20. Oakley, supra note 10, at 1834-35.
21. Id. at 1835.
22. Id. at 1837-43; see also Merrell Dow Pharrn. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-09
(1986).
23. Oakley, supra note IO, at 1838-39. Oakley notes that these types of claims fall under
Justice Holmes's test that" '(a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."' Id. at
1838 (quoting Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241U.S.257, 260 (1916)).
24. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-10
(1983).
25. Oakley, supra note 10, at 1839 (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813, quoting Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13).
26. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813; see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
u.s. 800, 808-09 (1988).
27. Therefore, this Article will assume that the second, substantive step, of the "arising under"
test is met when discussing issues regarding federal question jurisdiction.
28. Oakley, supra note I0, at 1834.
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anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is
thought the defendant may interpose. 29

Federal question jurisdiction is established "only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded
complaint. " 30
The Supreme Court has continued to flesh out the contours of the
well-pleaded complaint rule since the rule's inception. 31 A defense based
on federal law falls outside the lens of the well-pleaded complaint, and
therefore cannot form the basis for federal question jurisdiction. 32 In
addition, parts of the complaint that merely "anticipate" a defense based
on federal law do not fall within the well-pleaded complaint. 33 These
anticipations, while part of the complaint, cannot be considered as a
basis for "arising under" jurisdiction.34
B.

Removal Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), any civil action filed in state court
may be removed by a defendant to federal court if the federal court
would have original jurisdiction over the case. 35 "In general an action is
removable to a federal court only if it might have been brought there
originally."36 Removal can be based on diversity of citizenship37 or the
existence of federal questionjurisdiction. 38 As§ 1441(a) indicates:

29. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914). The Supreme Court's decision in
Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36 (1889), is credited with the "ultimate articulation of the wellpleaded complaint rule." Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy:
Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 597, 615 (1987).
30. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
31. See generally Doemberg, supra note 29, at 611-26.
32. See e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (denying
federal question jurisdiction based solely on a federal question presented in a defense or a reply to
the plaintiff's complaint); see also Doemberg, supra note 28, at 614-20 (collecting Supreme Court
cases defining the rule).
33. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152; see also Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454,
459 (1894); Shreveport, 129 U.S. at 41-44.
34. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(a) (2000); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63
(1987); 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3721 (1976) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE].
36. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 35, § 3721.
37. See id
38. Caterpillar Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
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Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending. For
purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants
sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded. 39

A district court's removal jurisdiction is defined by its original
jurisdiction. 40
Therefore, the test for original jurisdiction applies to determination
of removal jurisdiction. Of importance for this Article, the well-pleaded
complaint rule governs what papers can be considered to decide
questions of removal. 41 Removal is proper only if the federal question
appears within the lens of the well-pleaded complaint. 42 The wellpleaded complaint rule limits removal jurisdiction of a federal district
court just as it limits a court's original jurisdiction. A federal defense in
a defendant's answer, for example, cannot form the basis for removal
jurisdiction. 43
C.

Patent Law Jurisdiction

1. District Court Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Patent
Cases
A district court's jurisdiction over patent, copyright, and trademark
cases falls within the general scheme of federal question jurisdiction
defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1338, specifically § 1338(a), lists
three federal causes of action, under patent, copyright, and federal
trademark law, as falling within a district court's original jurisdiction. 44
Section 1338 continues, noting that federal district courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over cases "arising under" patent and copyright cases.

39. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
40. See Doemberg, supra note 29, at 625-26.
41. Id.; see also Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71
IOWA L. REV. 717, 717-18 (\986).
42. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; see also Gully v. First Nat'I Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13
(1936).
43. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392-93; see also Doemberg, supra note 29, at 625-26.
44. Section I 338(a) actually lists four causes of action-patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. 28 U.S.C. § \338(a) (2000). For the purposes of this Article, the first
two-patents and plant variety protection-will be collectively referred to as patents.
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45

Section 1338 reads, in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety
protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection
and copyright cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety
protection or trademark laws. 46

Section 1338(a) establishes the district court's original jurisdiction
over those cases "arising under" federal patent, copyright, and trademark
law. And this original jurisdiction, defined by the first sentence of
§ 1338(a), defines the breadth of ''jurisdiction ... [to be] exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright
cases.'.4 7 Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, if a case does not
arise under patent or copyright law, it does not fall within a federal
district court's exclusive jurisdiction, as defined by§ 1338(a).
The phrase "arising under" is defined in the same manner under
§ 1338(a) and§ 1331. The Supreme Court has linked the "arising under"
language in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) to the same language in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.48 The Court has noted that "[l]inguistic consistency, to which
[the Supreme Court] historically adhered, demands that § 1338(a)
jurisdiction" be determined in the same manner as general federal
question jurisdiction under § 1331.49 The Court has long applied the
same test to determine "arising under" for patent cases and general
federal question cases. 50
The "linguistic consistency" between the two statutes, both using
the same "arising under" language, forces courts to use the same test for
determining jurisdiction under§ 1338(a) as under § 1331.51 Therefore, if
a cause of action arises under federal patent, copyright, or trademark
45. Section 1338(c), was added in 1998 by Pub. L. 105-304 to equate a district court's
jurisdiction over rights in mask works with those defined in parts (a) and (b) of the statute with
regards to copyrights. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(c) (2000).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)-(b) (2000).
47. Id. § 1338(a).
48. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988).
49. Id. at 808.
50. Id. at 808-09.
51. Id. at 807-08.
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law, then that cause of action must, by definition, arise under federal
law. A case including one of the specified federal causes of action in
§ 1338(a) must, necessarily, fall within the scope of§ 1331. Such a case
arises within a district court's general.federal question jurisdiction. That
is, § 1338(a) defines a subset of cases within the broader set of potential
federal question jurisdiction cases. This is displayed graphically in
Figure 1 below, with a district court's statutory scope of jurisdiction
under§ 1338(a) falling completely within, but not totally consuming, the
full statutory scope of jurisdiction-"arising under" jurisdictionafforded by § 1331.

District Court's
28 U.S.C. § 1331
Jurisdiction
(Federal Question)

FIGURE

District Court's
28 U.S.C. § 1338
Jurisdiction
(Patent, Copyright,
Trademark)

1

Because of this linguistic consistency between the two statutes, the
well-pleaded complaint rule applies to determinations of jurisdiction
under § 1338 as well as determinations under § 1331. The test under
§ 1338 is simply the general federal question jurisdiction test modified
to apply only to patent, copyright, and trademark cases. The Court has
applied this modified test before, indicating that:
[section] 1338(a) jurisdiction ... extend[s] only to those cases in
which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent
law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
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patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims. 52

Therefore, any change in the test for determining "arising under"
jurisdiction in § 1331 necessarily changes the test for § 1338(a).
Linguistic consistency requires such a reaction. The converse is also
true-with changes in the test for determining "arising under"
jurisdiction under § 1338(a) affecting the test under § 1331. Such a
result is demonstrated empirically with the Supreme Court's decision in
Christianson. 53 That decision, while focused on questions of patent law,
"speaks in terms applicable to the more general question of when any
case may be adjudicated by the district courts as one arising under
federal law. " 54 Linguistic consistency forces these general statements,
affecting general "arising under" jurisdiction, when speaking of patent
law jurisdiction and§ 1338(a).
2.

Federal Circuit's Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction Over Patent
Cases
The Federal Circuit's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases builds off of the jurisdictional definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 55
Congress defined the scope of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction
over patent appeals from district courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l). The
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over district court patent cases 56
is based on § 1295(a)(l) jointly interpreted with the patent jurisdiction
statute for district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 57 This linkage between
§ 1295(a)(l) and§ 1338(a) is coded into the language of§ 1295(a)(l). 58
Section 1295(a)(l) reads, in relevant part:

52. Id. at 808-09.
53. Id.
54. Oakley, supra note 10, at 1830.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l) (2000).
56. In addition to district courts of the United States, § 1295(a)(I) also gives the Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over patent appeals from "the United States District Court for the District of the
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District
Court for the Northern Mariana Islands." Id.
57. Section 1295 also defines the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over subject matter other then
patent appeals from district courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2-!4), (b), (c) (2000).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l) (2000); see also Emmette F. Hale, Ill, The "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 229, 238-39 (!986); Thomas H. Case & Scott R. Miller, Note, An Appraisal of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301, 303 n.18 (1984).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction-(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a
district court ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or
in part, on section 1338 of [28 U.S.C.], except that a case involving a
claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights,
exclusive rights in mask works, or trademarks and no other claim
under section 1338(a) shall be governed by sections 1291, 1292, and
1294 of this title. 59

As noted in the language of§ 1295(a)(l), the Federal Circuit has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a final district court decision as long
as the district court's jurisdiction "was based, in whole or in part, on"
patent jurisdiction defined in "section 1338."60
These two statutes-28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(l) and 1338-linked
together by the language in § 1295(a)(l ), define the Federal Circuit's
"exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over patent appeals from district court
final decisions. 61 The jurisdiction over patent cases for both the Federal
Circuit and federal district courts is tied to § 1338.62 Furthermore, both
§ 1295(a)(l) and § 1338(a) use the same legally significant phrase,
"arising under," to define those cases that the Federal Circuit and federal
district courts have jurisdiction over. 63 In the legislative history of 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l), Congress emphasized the "arising under" language
of the statutes, noting that "[c]ases will be within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the same sense that cases are

59. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(I) (2000).
60. Id. Congress specifically drafted§ 1295(a)(I) to
give[] the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit jurisdiction of any appeal in which
the trial court jurisdiction was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of title 28
(which as stated above confers on the district courts original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyright and trademarks), except that jurisdiction of an appeal in a case involving a
claim arising under any Act of Congress related to copyrights or trademarks, and no
other claims under section l338(a) will continue to go to the regional appellate courts,
pursuant to section 1294 of title 28.
H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 41 (1981). "[T]he statutory language in question requires that the district
court have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338." S. REP. No. 97-275, at 19 (1981), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29. The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have also observed that
§ 1295(a)(l), as drafted, defines the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction with reference the
district court's jurisdiction over the case on appeal. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
61. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807.
62. Id.
63. 28 U.S.C. §§ l295(a)(l), 1338(a).
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said to 'arise under' federal law for purposes of federal question
jurisdiction. "64
The Supreme Court recognized this linkage, between the Federal
Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over patent cases and the original
jurisdiction afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1338, in Christianson. 65 In that case,
the Court considered whether antitrust claims plead by the plaintiff fell
within the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction defined by
§ 1295(a)(l). 66 After examining the statutory framework, the Court
concluded that the question of the Federal Circuit's exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals required a determination of the district
court's original patent jurisdiction. 67 Questions concerning the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction in instances such as Christianson "tum[] on
whether ... a case 'aris[es] under' a federal patent statute, for if it [does]
then the jurisdiction of the District Court was based at least 'in part' on
§ 1338," and therefore the Federal Circuit gains appellate jurisdiction
under§ 1295(a)(l). 68
Thus, as the well-pleaded complaint rule plays a role in determining
jurisdiction under§ 1338(a), so does the rule play a role with regard to
the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. "Since the district court's
jurisdiction is determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint ...
the referent for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction must be the same."69
The Federal Circuit's authority over a patent appeal pursuant to
§ 1295(a)(I) depends on the well-pleaded complaint just as the district
court's authority over the case pursuant to § 1338(a) depends on it. 70
Representing this graphically, Figure 2, shown below, visually
depicts the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction covering some of the
cases falling within the district court's original jurisdiction under§ 1338.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 41.
486 U.S. at 807.
Id.
Id. at 807-08.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 814.
Id.
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FIGURE 2

The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction only covers those patent cases
falling within the district court's § 1338 jurisdiction, not the copyright
and trademark cases. 71 Also, as the diagram suggests, just as § 1338
jurisdiction falls within § 1331 jurisdiction, § 1295(a)(l) ·appellate
jurisdiction falls within § 1331 jurisdiction. All three statutes are linked,
either by use of the same operative phrase-"arising under" in both
§ 13 3 8 and § 13 31-or by specific reference to the other statutes§ 1295(a)(l)'s reference to§ 1338.
With this background, it becomes clear that decisions regarding the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction, such as the one in Christianson,
directly implicate a district court's general "arising under" jurisdiction
under § 1331. 72 Sections 1331 and 1338 are linked by "linguistic
consistency"-the using of the same operative phrase "arising under."
Sections 1338 and 1295(a)(l) are linked by the statutory coding-with
§ 1295(a)(l) specifically referencing a district court's jurisdiction under
§ 1338. Basically, via the transitive property, just as § 1295(a)(l) is tied
to § 1338, the appellate jurisdiction statute is tied to § 1331. 73 This
interrelationship, depicted graphically in Figure 2 above, causes
decisions concerning the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction to have
ripples that, as a matter of law, effect general federal question
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l)(2000).
72. Oakley, supra note 10, at 1829-30 (noting that the Court's decision in Christianson is
applicable to the general issue offederal question jurisdiction).
73. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-09.
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jurisprudence. The resulting far-reaching effects of such decisions of
patent law appellate jurisdiction have been seen once before, from the
stone thrown in Christianson, 74 and have now been seen once again with
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Holmes.
II.

THE HOLMES DECISION, THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S APPELLATE
JURISDICTION AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN GENERAL

A.

The Supreme Court's Decision in Holmes

The Supreme Court revisits "arising under" jurisdiction and the
well-pleaded complaint rule in Holmes. The case began in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas, where Holmes sued
Vornado alleging seven causes of action: "(l) declaratory judgment of
non-liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) [section43 of the Lanham Act];
(2) violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, §§ 2 and 11; (3) violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a); (4) tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage; (5) defamation; (6) unfair competition; and (7) injurious
falsehood." 75 Vornado responded to Holmes's complaint, specifically
alleging counterclaims based in federal law. Specifically, Vornado
claimed that Holmes infringed some of Vornado's patents and its
federally protected trade dress. 76
The district court granted Holmes summary judgment of no
infringement and Vornado appealed the case to the Federal Circuit. 77
Holmes argued that the appeal properly lay in the Tenth Circuit, not the
Federal Circuit, because Holmes's complaint did not allege any claims
"arising under" patent law. 78 Holmes contended that Vornado's patent
infringement counterclaim cannot create "arising under" jurisdiction
because such claims did not fall within the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 79 After the appeal was heard, the Federal Circuit remanded the case

74. See generally Oakley, supra note JO (discussing the broad implications of the
Christianson decision).
75. Brief for Petitioner at *2, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535
U.S. 826 (2002) (No. 01-408), available at 2002 WL 24105.
76. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1141
(D. Kan. 2000). After unsuccessfully making this argument in the United States District Court,
Vornado again asserted this claim in his brief to the United States Supreme Court. Brief for
Petitioner, at *4-5 n.3, Holmes (No. 01-408).
77. See id. at *IO n.8-*l 1.
78. See id. at * 11.
79. Id. at* 12.
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to have the district court reconsider its grant of summary judgment in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Traffix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc. 80 The Federal Circuit did not address Holmes's
jurisdictional challenge. 81
Holmes challenged the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction in its
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Court granted Holmes's
petition to consider whether the Federal Circuit properly asserted
jurisdiction over [Vornado's] appeal. 82 The Court concluded that based
on the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l), "the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of the district court, and turns
on whether the action arises under federal patent law."83 The Court noted
that the language, "arising under," in § 1338(a), which gives district
court's jurisdiction over patent cases, is "the same operative language as
28 U.S.C. § 1331, the statute conferring general federal question
jurisdiction."84 Looking to the Court's decision in Christianson, the
Court stated that "[l]inguistic consistency" required it to apply the same
"arising under" test employed under § 1338(a) as is applied under
§ 1331. 85 With the well-pleaded-complaint rule case law "long
govern[ing] whether a case 'arises under' federal law for purposes of
§ 1331," the Court applied the rule to determine the appellate
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. 86
The Court determined that "'appropriately adapted to § 1338(a),'
the well-pleaded complaint rule provides that whether a case 'arises
under' patent law 'must be determined from what necessarily appears in
the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or
declaration .... "'87 Holmes, the plaintiff below, did not assert any claim
arising under federal patent law in its complaint, and therefore, based on
the well-pleaded complaint rule, the civil action did not "aris[e] under"
federal patent law under § 1338(a). 88 The Federal Circuit did not have
80. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 13 Fed. Appx. 961, 961 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
81. See id. at 961-62.
82. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 827.
83. Id. at 829.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 830.
86. Id. The Court also indicated, in a footnote, that the well-pleaded complaint rule governs
the removability of a case from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § l44l(a). Id. at n.2 (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)).
87. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S.
800, 809 (1988)).
88. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830.
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appellate jurisdiction. 89 The Supreme Court found the requirements of
§ 1338(a) were not met, and, as a result, § 1295(a)(l) did not confer
jurisdiction on the Federal Circuit. 90 The Federal Circuit's judgment was
therefore vacated and the case remanded to the Federal Circuit with
instructions to transfer the case to the Tenth Circuit. 91
B.

The Holmes Decision's Effect on the Federal Circuit's Appellate
Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court's decision in Holmes speaks directly to the
limits of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction.92 The Court
specifically indicated that:
Not all cases involving a patent-law claim fall within the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction. By limiting the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to
cases in which district courts would have jurisdiction under § 1338,
Congress referred to a well-established body of law that requires courts
to consider whether a patent-law claim appears on the face of the
plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. 93

Thus, for cases similar to Holmes, where the only patent law claim
appears in a counterclaim, the appropriate venue for appeals is the
regional circuit court. 94 This result is a significant departure from over
ten years of case law, where such cases, upon appeal, were handled by
the Federal Circuit. 95
This result is the clearest impact of the Holmes decision-that the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction cannot be based on patent law

89. See id.
90. Id. at 829-30.
91. Id. at 834.
92. Id. at 829-32.
93. Id. at 834.
94. Id.; see also Rogers, supra note 4, at 457-59; Cotropia, supra note 4, at 286-88; MosleyGoren, supra note 4, at 27-28.
95. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 745
(Fed. Cir. 1990); see also In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2000); DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (exercising jurisdiction over the judgment on DSC's copyright and trade secret claims and
Pulse's unrelated patent infringement counterclaims); Leatherman Tool Group Inc. v. Cooper
Indus., 13 I F.3d IOI I, 1013-15 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (considering whether a counterclaim to a complaint
alleging trade dress infringement included a substantial and necessary issue of patent law so as to
give the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction); Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 825 F.2d 604, 606 (!st Cir.
1987); Mosley-Goren, supra note 4, at 11-20.
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counterclaims. 96 The Federal Circuit, since the Court's decision, has
applied the Holmes decision and transferred appeals to the appropriate
regional circuit. For example, in Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v.
Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc., the Federal Circuit, because of the
Supreme Court's decision in Holmes, raised the question of appellate
jurisdiction sua sponte after oral argument. 97 In Telecomm, a group of
independent service organizations ("ISOs") sued Siemens claiming
monopolization and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act. 98
Siemens counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement. 99 The
ISOs appealed a jury verdict on the counterclaims of patent and
copyright infringement and a grant of summary judgment on its Sherman
Act claims. 100 The Federal Circuit concluded that "[w]hen the ISOs
originally filed [the] appeal, [the Federal Circuit's] jurisdiction was
predicated on the patent infringement counterclaim." 101 But, based on
the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes, which was "directly on point,"
the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. 102 The case was,
therefore, transferred to the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631.103
The Federal Circuit and regional circuits have reached similar
results in other cases since the Holmes decision. 104 The cases have either

96. An argument can be made that Holmes removes other cases from the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction, depending on the procedural posture of the patent claim. See Cotropia, supra
note 4, at 286-94 (discussing, for example, the impact of the Holmes decision on patent law claims
presented in a consolidated case). Consideration of these effects beyond patent Jaw counterclaims is,
however, beyond the scope of this Article.
97. 295 F.3d 1249, 1251-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
98. Id. at 1250-51.
99. Id. at 1251.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1251-52 (citing Aerojet, 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
102. Telecomm, 295 F.3d at 1252.
I 03. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has since decided the case on the merits. See Telecom Tech.
Servs., Inc. v. Rolm Co., No. 02-14131, 2004 WL 2360293 (I Ith Cir. 2004).
104. Phann. Research & Mfg. of Am. v. Walsh, 81 Fed. Appx. 327, 328 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(transferring an appeal to the First Circuit because the plaintiff's "complaint is devoid of any patent
claims, and thus, the district court's jurisdiction was not based on § 1338"); E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. v. Okuley, 344 F.3d 578, 583 n.3 (6th Cir. 2002) (maintaining jurisdiction over an
appeal because "Okuley's counterclaim [of sole patent inventorship] does not affect the issue of
appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit"); Medigene AG v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 41 Fed.
Appx. 450, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (transferring appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit under principles established in Holmes); Mattel, lnc. v. Lehman, 49 Fed. Appx. 889,
890 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that, after Holmes, the "court does not have jurisdiction over claims
presented in an answer or counterclaim ifthe complaint does not involve patent issues.").
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been transferred to the appropriate regional circuit or kept in a regional
circuit because the only patent law claim arose in a counterclaim. 105

C.

The Holmes Decision and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

The ramifications of the Holmes decision on the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction and the doctrinal development of patent law is
extremely interesting and important. 106 But, in a similar fashion as the
Supreme Court's decision in Christianson, by answering questions
regarding the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, the Court necessarily spoke
to federal question jurisdiction in general. The Supreme Court, for the
first time, addressed whether a federal law counterclaim fell within the
scope of the well-pleaded complaint, and therefore could lay the
foundation for federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was
forced to address this broader issue concerning federal jurisdiction due
to the connections between the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction
and the federal district court's jurisdiction. As explained in Part I, there
are statutory and linguistic links between the jurisdiction of Federal
Circuit and federal district courts.
In order to make its decision in Holmes regarding the Federal
Circuit's appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court had to speak to a
district court's jurisdiction over patent cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338. 107 Linguistic similarity between§ 1338(a) and§ 1331-the use
of the phrase "arising under"-forced the Court to discuss a district
court's jurisdiction over federal question cases. 108 From there, the Court
was required to speak to how "arising under" jurisdiction is determined,
and, more particularly, the scope of the well-pleaded complaint. 109
The Court noted that "the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is fixed with
reference to that of the district court, and turns on whether the action
arises under federal patent law." 110 The Supreme Court concluded that
an action where the only patent claim is a counterclaim did not "aris[e]
under federal patent" and therefore did not fall within the district court's
§ 1338 jurisdiction and thus, the Federal Circuit's appellate

I 05. See cases cited supra note I 04.
106. The author examined such ramifications of the Holmes decision in Cotropia, supra note 4.
107. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l) (2000).
108. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 829-30.
109. Id. at 830-32.
110. Id. at 829 (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction. 111 In fact, the Supreme Court rejected Vomado's argument
to delink the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(l)
from the district court's "arising under" jurisdiction over patent cases
under§ 1338(a). 112 The coded tie between§ 1295(a)(l) and§ 1338(a)
prevented such a different interpretation. 113 Section 1295(a)(l) "refers to
the jurisdiction under § 1338"-causing any jurisdictional decision
regarding the Federal Circuit to, necessarily, create a jurisdictional
decision regarding the district court. 114 The Court also rejected
Vomado's contention that § 1338(a) could be interpreted differently
when referring to the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction than when referring
to the district court's jurisdiction. 115 Such a conclusion "would be an
unprecedented feat of interpretative necromancy to say that § 1338(a)'s
'arising under' language means one thing (the well-pleaded-complaint
rule) in its own right, but something quite different (respondent's
complaint-or-counterclaim rule) when referred to by § 1295(a)(l)." 116
Thus, the Court held that a case where the only patent law claim is a
counterclaim does not fall within the district court's "arising under"
jurisdiction of § 1338(a) because such a claim lies outside the wellpleaded complaint's lens. 117
For the Court to reach this decision, it also, necessarily, had to
speak to the scope of a district court's general federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 118 When construing the "arising
11 I. Id. at 830.
112. Id. at 832-34.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 833; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(I) (2000).
115. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 833-34.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 830-31.
118. Id. at 829-30; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a) (2000).
A similar situation occurred as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). The Court was faced with an analogous question to
the one it faced in Holmes-did the Federal Circuit have appellate jurisdiction under§ 1295(a)(l)and, the Court, just as in Holmes, had to answer questions concerning the "arising under"
jurisdiction over federal district courts. Id. at 807-10. The Court in Christianson, as discussed supra
in Part I, recognized the statutory link between § 1295(a)(J) and § 1338 and the linguistic link
between§ 1338 and§ 1331. 486 U.S. at 807-09. The Court, as in Holmes, had to speak to the scope
of "arising under" jurisdiction and the well-pleaded complaint rule in order to answer a question
regarding the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. Id. As Oakley framed the situation,
Christianson involved:
[F]acts and legal contentions that superficially relate only to that arcane comer of federal
jurisdiction concerned with appellate review of cases arising under the patent laws.
But ... the opinion speaks in terms applicable to the more general question of when any
case may be adjudicated by the district courts as one arising under federal law.
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under" language found in § 1338(a), the Co~ automatically interpreted
the same language in § 1331. The "'[l]inguistic consistency' require[d]
[the Court] to apply the same test to determine whether a case arises
under § 1338(a) as under § 1331." 119 Therefore, when deciding the
contours of the well-pleaded complaint rule under § 1338(a), the Court
had to interpret the contours of the rule as applied to questions of
jurisdiction under § 1331. So as counterclaims were filtered out as a
foundation for patent law jurisdiction under § 1338(a), the Court also
concluded that counterclaims are unable to form the basis for federal
question jurisdiction under § 1331. Therefore, not only did Vornado' s
patent infringement counterclaim not create jurisdiction under§ 1338(a),
the counterclaim also did not vest the district court with jurisdiction
pursuant to § 1331.
The Supreme Court's basic holding in Holmes, therefore, is that
"counterclaim[s] . . . cannot serve as the basis for 'arising under'
jurisdiction." 120 The Court based its decision to exclude counterclaims
from the jurisdictional analysis on the well-pleaded complaint rule. The
Court explicitly declined to "transform the long-standing well-pleadedcomplaint rule into the 'well-pleaded-complaint-or-counterclaim
rule. "' 121 This marked the first time the Court addressed whether
counterclaims fell within the scope of the well-pleaded complaint. While
arguably a natural application of previous case law concluding that a
federal defense cannot establish arising under jurisdiction, 122 the Court
noted that its prior cases had not required them to address whether
counterclaims fell within the well-pleaded complaint. 123 The Supreme
Court's addressing of counterclaims in relation to the well-pleaded
complaint rule for the first time provides a perfect opportunity to address
the implications of the rule in the counterclaim context.

Oakley, supra note 10, at 1830.
Holmes presents the same situation as the Court's decision in Christianson. While the case deals
with a question regarding an "arcane corner of federal jurisdiction," the Court, in order to answer
the question before it, must address general concepts of federal jurisdiction. Like Christianson, the
Court must address the issue of "arising under" jurisdiction in general in order to determine the
appropriate appellate court for Vornado' s appeal.
119. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830.
120. Id. at 831.
121. Id. at 832 (emphasis original).
122. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211U.S.149, 152 (1908).
123. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 831.
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THE lMPLICA TIONS OF COUNTERCLAIMS FALLING OUTSIDE THE
WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT

The Supreme Court's recent examination of the relationship
between counterclaims, the well-pleaded complaint, and federal
jurisdiction prompts the need for a more complete analysis of this
interrelationship. The facts in the Holmes decision, while prompting the
Supreme Court to speak on this issue, do not fully explore the
ramifications of leaving counterclaims outside the well-pleaded
complaint. This part of the Article will explore in detail the implications
of this facet of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Such an analysis can be
divided up into three general areas. First, the implications of leaving
counterclaims outside the well-pleaded complaint on a federal district
court's original jurisdiction will be discussed. Due to the rule of law
explained in the Holmes decision, a federal law counterclaim 124 cannot
serve as an independent jurisdictional basis for a case. Second, the
implications of the well-pleaded complaint on removal jurisdiction and
federal law counterclaims will be discussed. The rule of law discussed in
Holmes prevents a federal law counterclaim from forming the basis of
removal jurisdiction from state to federal court. Thus, a defendant in
state court cannot remove a case to federal court based solely on the
presence of a federal law counterclaim. Third, the implications of
counterclaims falling outside the well-pleaded complaint on areas of
exclusive federal jurisdiction will be discussed. Counterclaims arising
under areas of exclusive federal law may, depending on how their
exclusivity statutes are drafted, fall outside of exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts and be litigated in state court. If the statute that gives a
federal cause of action exclusivity to the federal courts uses the magical
"arising under" language, such counterclaims will not fall within the
exclusivity of the federal system.
A.

Federal Question Jurisdiction Based on Federal Law
Counterclaims

The facts of the Holmes case fail to fully demonstrate the
implication of the well-pleaded complaint rule on a district court's
original jurisdiction over a federal law counterclaim. The result of
124. The phrase "federal law counterclaim" is short-hand for a counterclaim that passes the
substantive test for determining "arising under" jurisdiction discussed supra in Part I.A. That is, a
"federal law counterclaim" is a claim where either (i) federal law creates the cause of action or (ii) it
appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of the claim.
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Holmes decision was that the case before the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas did not "aris[e] under" patent law. 125
But, the district court maintained federal question jurisdiction over the
case. In fact, the plaintiff's complaint contained claims of trademark
infringement, 126 vesting the district court with original jurisdiction under
§ 1338(a), albeit due to the federal trademark law nature of the claims,
not a patent law aspect of either parties' claims. 127 Therefore, after the
Holmes decision, the case's appellate path changed, 128 but the case
stayed in the federal court system.
If claims "arising under" federal law were not present in Holmes's
complaint, the full implication of the well-pleaded complaint rule on
federal law counterclaims would have played out. The district court
could not look to the patent law counterclaims as a basis for
jurisdiction. 129 With no federal claims in the plaintiff's complaint, the
district court could have maintained jurisdiction over the case only if the
diversity requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 were met. If diversity was
not present, the district court would have had to dismiss the case
altogether for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The full import of the
well-pleaded complaint rule, as discussed by the Court in Holmes,
creates this very result-a federal law counterclaim cannot form the
independent basis for original jurisdiction. If it were not for the federal
trademark claims in Holmes's complaint, the Court's decision in Holmes
would have caused the case, absent a finding of diversity jurisdiction, to
be dismissed from federal court altogether.
While such a complete dismissal was not the result under the facts
in Holmes, it would be in other cases, given the appropriate set of facts.
A district court starts its jurisdictional analysis based on the plaintiff's
complaint. 130 That complaint may allege certain causes of action based
on federal law-vesting the district court with federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 131 The complaint may, in the
alternative or in addition, allege diversity between the plaintiff and
defendant and the appropriate amount in controversy-vesting the

125. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 829-30.
126. Brief for Petitioner at *3, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. 535
U.S. 826 (2002) (No. 01-408), available at 2002 WL 24105.
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
128. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 834 (remanding with instructions to transfer to the Tenth Circuit).
129. See id. at 831.
130. Id. at 829-30; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
131. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 829-31; see also Oakley, supra note 10, at 1833-43.
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district court with diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 132 From
this starting point, a defendant may in her answer, among other
allegations, allege certain counterclaims, either compulsory under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 13(a) or permissive under
FRCP 13(b). 133 The district court may entertain supplemental
jurisdiction over these counterclaims given that the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1367 are met. 134
However, the jurisdictional basis in the plaintiffs complaint may,
after further investigation, not hold true. A party, or the court, may
question whether the plaintiffs complaint truly alleges a cause of action
substantively "arising under" federal law as required for jurisdiction
under§ 1331. Or, a party or the court may question whether there is
truly diversity between the parties or the amount in controversy is
sufficient to establish jurisdiction under § 1332. These challenges may
be sua sponte from the court, or come in the form of a FRCP 12(b)(l)
motion by a party. 135 Regardless how the challenge surfaces, if granted,
the complaint provides no basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 136 The
question then turns to the counterclaims which then determine whether
the district court can still hear the case.
This is the circumstance under which the well-pleaded complaint
rule as applied to counterclaims becomes an issue. If there is no other
independent jurisdictional basis, can the federal district court find its
subject matter jurisdiction in a federal law counterclaim? 137 The basic
rule set forth in Holmes, that "a counterclaim ... cannot serve as a basis
for 'arising under' jurisdiction," 138 answers the question in the negative.
Counterclaims, not being part of the well-pleaded complaint, cannot
form the basis for "arising under" jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. 139 They are filtered out of the "arising under" jurisdictional
132. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)-(b).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
135. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413, 419-21 (1911) (noting that a
court may raise, on its own, questions of subject matter jurisdiction).
136. A dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) is a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, ordinarily having the effect of disposing of the case as if it was never initially filed.
See, e.g., Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561F.2d606, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1977).
137. If the counterclaim alleges a state cause of action, then it cannot arise under federal law,
even if counterclaims can be considered to establish such jurisdiction. These claims fail, regardless
of in which paper they appear, under the second, substantive part of the "arising under"
jurisdictional test. See supra Part I.A.
138. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002).
139. Id.
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analysis before they can be analyzed substantively. And, if the case does
not meet the diversity requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the district
court, if it is to maintain jurisdiction over the case, must look
elsewhere. 140 When the complaint provides no basis for jurisdiction, and
there is no diversity, the case must be dismissed regardless of the federal
nature of a counterclaim.
A recent example of this effect of the well-pleaded complaint rule
on a district court's original jurisdiction can be found in Salton, Inc. v.
Philips Domestic Appliances & Personal Care B. V. 141 In Salton, the
district court lost diversity jurisdiction, and, applying the well-pleaded
complaint rule discussed in Holmes, could not tum to a federal law
counterclaim to save its subject matter jurisdiction. 142 Salton filed a
complaint against Philips seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not
tortiously interfere with an agreement between Philips and a third party,
Electrical & Electronics, Ltd. ("E & E"), and that it did not
misappropriate trade secrets from Philips. 143 Salton alleged federal
jurisdiction based on the diversity of citizenship between Salton and
Philips pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 144 Philips responded to
Salton's complaint, counterclaiming that Salton violated the Illinois
Trade Secret Act, tortiously interfered with the agreement between
Philips and E & E, and infringed certain federal copyrights held by
Philips. 145 The only claims based on federal law were presented in
Philips's counterclaim. 146
E & E moved to intervene in the lawsuit for the limited purpose of
seeking dismissal of the action pursuant to FRCP l 2(b )(7) for failure to
join a party under FRCP 19. 147 E & E asserted that it was a necessary
party, considering the claims surrounding E & E's agreement with
Philips, that it could not be joined as a party and that the district court

140. The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides no relief for a district
court in this situation. Section 1367 can only provide supplemental jurisdiction for courts that
already have an independent basis for jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
141. No. 03 C 5660, 2004 WL 42371 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2004).
142. Id. at *5-7.
143. Id at *2.
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id The declaratory judgment actions by Salton, when converted into hypothetical claims,
simply present state law based claims, and therefore do not vest the district court with federal
question jurisdiction under§ 1331. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 67172 (1950).
147. Salton, 2004 WL 42371, at *2-3.
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should, therefore, dismiss the case. 148 If E & E was joined as a party, it
would destroy diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. 149 The district court
agreed with E & E finding E & E to be a necessary and indispensable
party. 150 The court also concluded that E & E's inclusion "would destroy
th[e] court's subject matter jurisdiction"-the court "would no longer
have subject matter jurisdiction under" § 1332. 151
Philips contested this conclusion by suggesting that the district
court had "original jurisdiction under § 1331 . . . by virtue of its
copyright claim arising under federal law." The court noted that the
copyright claim "was raised in Philips'[s] counterclaim." 152 Applying the
Supreme Court's decision in Holmes, which had recently been cited by
the Seventh Circuit in Adkins v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, the
court concluded that "Philips' [s] counterclaim, even if compulsory,
cannot serve as the basis for this court's jurisdiction under § 1331." 153
The court reasoned that Philips's copyright counterclaim did not fall
within the well-pleaded complaint and therefore could not serve as the
basis for "arising under" jurisdiction under § 1331. 154 The case was
dismissed because E & E was a necessary and indispensable party who,
if joined, would destroy the district court's only basis for jurisdiction
over the case. 155 The court in Salton applied the well-pleaded complaint
rule and concluded that a federal law counterclaim, by itself, cannot vest
the court with § 1331 jurisdiction.
The decision in Salton stands in contrast to a fair number of cases
before the Holmes decision that based their original jurisdiction on a
federal law counterclaim. 156 Some of these cases that the Holmes
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id. at *6.
150. Id. at *5.
151. Id. at *5-7.
152. Id. at *6.
153. Id. In the Adkins decision, relied upon by the Salton court, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that it could not rely on a third-party complaint filed pursuant to FRCP 14 as an independent basis
for jurisdiction. Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 326 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2003). The court concluded
that, just as counterclaims fall outside the well-pleaded complaint, so do pleadings by third parties.
Id. Therefore, even though a third party complaint presents questions "arising under" federal law,
that complaint cannot, after Holmes, form an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction
under § 1331. Id. The Adkins decision shows the even broader impact the Holmes decision may
have, beyond federal jurisdiction over counterclaims. Such "even broader" implications are beyond
the scope of this Article.
154. Salton, 2004 WL 42731, at *6.
155. Id. at *9.
I 56. See, e.g., 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1414 n.32 (2d ed. 1990) (collecting cases where a court found a counterclaim

2004)

COUNTERCLAIMS & FEDERAL JURISDICTION

27

decision implicitly overturns were noted in Justice Stevens's
concurrence. 157
A good example of a case "improperly" applying the well-pleaded
complaint rule, as set forth by the Court in Holmes, is Great Lakes
Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co. 158 In Great Lakes, the district
court's jurisdiction was initially based on the alleged diversity between
the plaintiff and defendant. 159 Great Lakes filed 'only state law claims
against Cooper. 16 Cooper responded by filing a counterclaim asserting
that Great Lakes violated sections one and two of the Sherman Act. 161
Cooper then moved to dismiss Great Lakes' complaint on the
grounds that there was no diversity of citizenship. 162 The district court
granted Cooper's motion, dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. 163 However, "[j]urisdiction of Cooper's counterclaim was
retained on the ground that it had an independent basis of jurisdiction in
that it asserted a claim arising under the laws of the United States." 164
Presumably, from that statement, the district court maintained
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based solely on the federal
antitrust counterclaim. Great Lakes then filed counterclaims to Cooper's
counterclaims-basically repeating "in substance the [state law]
allegations of its [now dismissed] amended complaint." 165 The Third
Circuit held that the district court properly had ancillary jurisdiction over
these counter-counterclaims by Great Lakes because they were
compulsory to Cooper's counterclaim. 166
The well-pleaded complaint rule, as explained in Holmes and
demonstrated by its application in Salton, commands a different outcome
in Great Lakes. The district court, after granting Cooper's motion for
lack of diversity, should have dismissed Cooper's counterclaims and not

°

"present[s] an independent basis of federal jurisdiction" that can be adjudicated even after a
plaintiffs claim is dismissed).
157. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 835-36 (2002)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing those cases cited in Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works,
Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 742-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
158. 286F.2d631 (3dCir.1961).
159. Id. at 631.
160. Id. at 631-32.
161. Id. at 632.
162. Id. at 633.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 634.
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entertained
Great
Lakes
counter-counterclaims. 167
Cooper's
counterclaim, while alleging a federal cause of action-antitrust-does
not "aris[e] under" federal law because it does not fall within the scope
of the well-pleaded complaint, it falls in the defendant's
counterclaims. 168
As another example, the well-pleaded complaint rule, as described
in Holmes, would also dictate a different result in Smalley v. United
States. 169 Marlin Smalley alleged in his complaint that the United States
had violated various sections of the Internal Revenue Code when
assessing his tax liability and instituting liens against his property. 170 The
complaint alleged claims "arising under" federal law, giving the district
court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. With the United States being
the defendant, the district court did not have diversity jurisdiction under
§ 1332. 171 The United States filed a counterclaim against Mr. Smalley
seeking foreclosures on the liens it had on his property. 172
After the court denied a United States motion for summary
judgment, Mr. Smalley sought withdrawal of his claims against the
United States. 173 The United States, in response, sought reconsideration
of its summary judgment motion. 174 The district court granted Mr.
Smalley's request for "withdrawal"-taking it as a motion for voluntary
dismissal pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2). 175 Notably, a dismissal under Rule
41(a)(2) is a dismissal without prejudice-operating as though Mr.
Smalley never filed the now dismissed claims with the court. 176 Such
claims, therefore, cannot serve as a jurisdictional footing for the district
court over the case. 177 The court concluded that such a situation did "not
impair Defendant's position. Defendant's counterclaim arises under

167. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002)
(finding that a federal law counterclaim cannot establish "arising under" jurisdiction).
168. Id. at 831-32.
169. No. 92-1052, 1992 WL 448499 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 20, 1992).
I 70. Id. at *I.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2004) (listing the situations in which district courts have diversity
jurisdiction; situations in which the United States is a party is not included).
172. Smalley, 1992 WL 448499, at *I.
l 73. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See. e.g., Humphreys v. United States, 272 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir. 1959) (noting that a
Rule 4l(a)(2) dismissal "leaves the situation the same as if the suit had never been brought in the
first place").
177. Smalley, 1992 WL 448499, at* I.

2004)

COUNTERCLAIMS & FEDERAL JURISDICTION

29

federal law, thus, dismissing Plaintiff's claim would not affect the
court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the counterclaim." 178
The well-pleaded complaint rule, however, prevents the district
court from concluding that the United States counterclaims "arise under"
federal law because of where they were plead. Once Mr. Smalley's
claims were dismissed, the district court, under the well-pleaded
complaint rule, would no longer have jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331. 179
In addition, § 1367 could not save its jurisdiction over the counterclaims
because, without the independent jurisdiction based on Mr. Smalley's
complaint, the court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the United States counterclaims. 180 Most likely, the case would have
been decided differently, with the district court not allowing Mr.
Smalley to voluntarily dismiss his claims because, to do so, would
unnecessarily prejudice the United States by forcing the dismissal of
their counterclaims. 181
The well-pleaded complaint rule, as set forth in Holmes, would also
prompt a different decision in Fax Telecommunicaciones, Inc. v.
AT&T. 182 Fax brought suit against AT&T in "New York State Supreme
Court asserting state common law contract and tort claims." 183 AT&T
removed the action to federal district court, asserting federal question
jurisdiction over the case under the Federal Communications Act
("FCA"). 184 Fax never objected or challenged the removal, and the case
went to judgment. 185 On appeal, the Second Circuit, sua sponte,
questioned whether the district court had jurisdiction over the case. 186
The Second Circuit concluded that removal was improper, but Fax
failed to make a timely objection to the removal and the question
became whether the district court had jurisdiction when it entered
judgment. 187 The court found jurisdiction based on AT&T' s
counterclaim that "plainly arose under federal law." 188 "AT&T's

178. Id
179. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002).
180. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000); 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1414 (2d ed. 1990).
181. FED. R. Clv. P. 41(a)(2).
182. 138 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 1998).
183. Id. at 485.
184. Id
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 487 (citing Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 700, 702 (1972)).
188. Id. at 488.
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counterclaim seeking to enforce the filed tariff provides a basis for
federal question j urisdi cti on." 189
The well-pleaded complaint rule _requires a different answer in Fax
Telecommunicaciones. AT&T' s counterclaim falls outside the wellpleaded complaint and, therefore, cannot form an independent basis for
federal question jurisdiction. 190 Interestingly, a district court faced a
similar issue as that in Fax Telecommunicaciones and refused to apply
the holding in Holmes. 191 The defendant argued that its federal law
counterclaim could not create jurisdiction over the dispute at the time the
judgment was entered because the Holmes decision prevented such
counterclaims from creating "arising under" jurisdiction. 192 The court
rejected this argument, refusing to ignore the Second Circuit's decision
in Fax Telecommunicaciones. 193 The court found that defendant's
argument "confuses the requirements for original jurisdiction with the
determination of jurisdiction post-judgment." 194 With the reasoning
behind the Court's application of the well-pleaded complaint rule in
Holmes, it is tough to see such a distinction.
Claims that clearly present a federal question cannot independently
vest a district court with federal question jurisdiction if such claims
appear in a counterclaim. 195 Once a district court loses jurisdiction under
§ 1331, because of a voluntary dismissal as in Smalley, or loses
jurisdiction under § 1332, because of the need to join a necessary and
indispensable party as in Salton, the district court cannot turn to a federal
law counterclaim for jurisdictional footing. Furthermore, when a court
'lacks jurisdiction initially, such as in Fax Telecommunicaciones, the
court cannot turn to a federal law counterclaim to gain jurisdiction over
the case, even at the time of judgment. The well-pleaded complaint rule,
as recently discussed by the Supreme Court in Holmes, filters these
federal law counterclaims out of the universe of claims substantively
considered to form the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
189. Id.
190. The Supreme Court has found jurisdiction in a circumstance similar to Fax
Te/ecommunicaciones, but the jurisdiction was based on diversity from the amount in controversy
presented by a defendant's counterclaim. Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173, 174-76 (1913).
This distinction, while ignored by the Second Circuit in Fax Telecommunicaciones, 138 F.3d at 487
n.6, is significant in light of the rule discussed in the Holmes decision.
191. Wells Fargo Bank N.W. v. TACA Int'I Airlines, S.A., 314 F. Supp. 2d 195, 198
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
192. Id. at 199.
193. Id. at 198.
194. Id. at 199.
195. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002).
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Removal Jurisdiction Based on Federal Law Counterclaims

The well-pleaded complaint rule also effects the scope of a federal
district court's removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. As
discussed in Part LB., "where there is no diversity of citizenship between
the parties-the propriety of removal turns on whether the case falls
within the original 'federal question' jurisdiction of the United States
district courts." 196 The scope of a district court's original jurisdiction
defines which cases can be removed from state court to a federal district
court[]". 197 A district court's original jurisdiction over federal questions
is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 198 And, as discussed above, the wellpleaded complaint rule affects the scope of federal question jurisdiction
over federal law counterclaims. 199 The well-pleaded complaint rule,
therefore, also applies to questions of removal jurisdiction. 200 "The wellpleaded-complaint rule ... governs whether a case is removable from
state to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) .... " 201 Just as
counterclaims can not form an independent basis for original jurisdiction
because they fall outside the well-pleaded complaint, counterclaims can
not form a basis for removal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in Holmes was particularly concerned with
what effect allowing counterclaims to fall within the well-pleaded
complaint would have on removal jurisdiction. 202 Allowing
counterclaims to create "arising under" jurisdiction, the Court reasoned,
would "radically expand the class of removable cases" to include those
where the only federal claim in the state case is a counterclaim. 203 If
counterclaims were eligible for consideration, "[i]t would allow a
defendant to remove a case brought in state court under state law ...
simply by raising a federal counterclaim. " 204 By defining the wellpleaded complaint to not include counterclaims, the Supreme Court
blocked this very scenario where a defendant's counterclaim facilitated
the removal of a case to federal court.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
Id at 8-9.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); see also Franchise Tax Bd, 463 U.S. at 8.
See supra Part 111.A.
See Doemberg, supra note 29, at 620-26.
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 n.2 (2002).
Id at 832.
Id.
Id. at 83I-32.
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While this was the first statement by the Supreme Court on the
issue of federal law counterclaims and removal, 205 other regional circuit
and district courts have already spoken, concluding that counterclaims
cannot form the basis for removal jurisdiction. 206 For example, the Ninth
Circuit, in Takeda v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co.
specifically held that a federal counterclaim can not form the basis for
removal jurisdiction.207 Northwestern asserted that its counterclaim,
under section 502 of BRISA, presented an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction and therefore for removal. 208 The court in Takeda rejected
Northwestern's argument, concluding that "[a] straight-forward
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule persuades us that removal
jurisdiction does not exist. .... The federal question defendants raise in
their counterclaims does not provide a basis for removal. " 209 Looking to
the Supreme Court's decision in Gully, the court noted that, when
determining whether a district court has jurisdiction to remove a case
from state court based on a federal question, "[t]he federal question
'must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the
answer or by the petition for removal. "'210
The Supreme Court's decision in Holmes follows the same analysis
as that in Takeda and other circuit court cases-a counterclaim is not
part of the well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, cannot be the trigger
for removal jurisdiction. 211 The ruling in Holmes affirms the lower court
case law concluding that federal law counterclaims cannot create
removal jurisdiction. Many federal district courts have already cited

205. Id.
206. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 1986); Takeda v.
Northwestern Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing numerous cases
supporting the proposition that "[r]emovability cannot be created by defendant pleading a counterclaim presenting a federal question ... "); Duckson, Carlson, Bassinger, LLC v. Lake Bank, 139 F.
Supp. 2d 1117, 1118-19 (D. Minn. 2001) (finding no removal jurisdiction based on counterclaims
and a third party defendants' claims that were not separate and independent from the other claims in
the case); Commercial Sales Network v. Sadler-Cisar, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 756, 758-60 (N.D. Ohio
1991) (granting a motion for remand because plaintitrs complaint contained no patent law claims
and defendants' counter-suit, handled as counterclaims, could not form the basis for removal);
Coditron Corp. v. AFA Protective Sys., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 158, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that
"the answer and [patent law] counterclaims of AFA do not provide a basis for removal"); Greene
Home Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Vogel, No. CA3:98-CV-2966-R, 1999 WL 292718, *I (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 12, 1999).
207. 765 F.2d at 821-22.
208. Id. at 821.
209. Id. at 822.
210. Id. (quoting Gully v. First Nat'! Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936)).
211. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002).
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Holmes for the proposition that "neither a federal defense nor
counterclaim will create removal jurisdiction. " 212

C.

Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Certain Federal Law Counterclaims

In addition to the effects on the original and removal jurisdiction of
federal district court, the well-pleaded complaint rule also has
ramifications for some areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction over
federal law counterclaims. In particular, the well-pleaded complaint rule
impacts exclusive federal jurisdiction when that exclusivity is defined in
relation to the federal district court's "arising under" jurisdiction. Cases
where the exclusive federal claim appears in a counterclaim do not arise
under federal law because they do not meet the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 213 Thus, state courts can handle such cases with counterclaims even
though, if the claim were presented in the complaint, the case would
have fallen in exclusive federal jurisdiction.
An example of an exclusive jurisdiction statute that defines the
scope of exclusivity with regards to "arising under" jurisdiction is 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a)-the patent, copyright, and trademark jurisdictional
statute at issue in Holmes. 214 Section 1338(a) first defines a district
court's original jurisdiction over "any civil action arising under any Act
of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks."215 The statute then indicates that "[s]uch jurisdiction shall
be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection
and copyright cases."216 A federal district court's exclusive jurisdiction
over patent and copyright cases is the same as its original jurisdiction

212. United Mut. Houses v. Andujar, 230 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also
lntegra Banlc, N.A. v. Greer, No. IP 4:02-CV-244 B/H, 2003 WL 21544260, *3-4 (S.D. Ind. June
26, 2003) (noting that even if a removal petition was timely filed, federal law counterclaims could
not, pursuant to the ruling in Holmes, "establish federal question jurisdiction" and thus support
removal); Flanders Diamond USA Inc. v. Nat'! Diamond Syndicate, Inc., No. 02 C 4605, 2002 WL
31681474, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2002) (denying removal to federal court because there were
no claims arising under patent law in the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint); R.F. Shinn
Contractors, Inc. v. Shinn, No. l:OICV00750, 2002 WL 31942135, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2002)
(remanding a case that included a patent infringement counterclaim to state court because of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 222 F. Supp. 2d 326, 330
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Holmes for the proposition that "answers and counterclaims cannot serve as
the basis for 'arising under' jurisdiction") (patent case).
213. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 829-32.
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(2000); see also supra Part LC.I.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
216. Id. Section 1338(a) excludes trademarks from the exclusive jurisdiction given to federal
district courts. Id.
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over such cases-an original jurisdiction determined if the case "aris[es]
under" patent or copyright law. 217 Based on the plain language of the
statute, the court's exclusive jurisdiction over such cases is coupled with
its "arising under" jurisdiction. 218
Cases in which the only patent or copyright claim presents itself in
a counterclaim do not fall within a federal court's original jurisdiction
under§ 1338(a). If a case in which the only patent or copyright claim is
presented in a counterclaim does not qualify as a "civil action arising
under" patent or copyright law, then, based on the plain reading of the
statute, § 1338(a) does not confer the federal court with exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. 219 These counterclaims are not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, and, therefore, state courts can
maintain jurisdiction over them. 220
This result is a departure from existing case law in the patent and
copyright area. Prior to the Holmes decision and its statement regarding
the well-pleaded complaint rule, many state courts concluded that
federal district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all patent and
copyright claims, even if they appear in the form of a counterclaim. 221 In
Tewarson, the Court of Appeals of Ohio concluded that state courts do
not have jurisdiction "over claims over which federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction."222 The appeals court, therefore, dismissed the
copyright counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction. 223 These cases are called
into question by the decision in Holmes, because these patent and
copyright counterclaims do not fall under a district court's original
217. Id.; see also supra Part I.C. l.
218. See Cotropia, supra note 4, at 296.
219. One could argue that the second sentence in § 1338(a), which defines the scope of
exclusive jurisdiction, refers to a federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over specific claims, not the
whole case. The plain language of § 1338(a), however, defines both original and exclusive
jurisdiction in terms of the "civil action," not particular claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
Therefore, any effect Holmes has on the district court's "arising under" jurisdiction over patent and
copyright cases also impacts the federal court system's exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
220. See Cotropia, supra note 4, at 294-97.
221. See Tewarson v. Simon, 750 N.E.2d 176, 183 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the state
court lacked jurisdiction over copyright counterclaim because federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction "over claims arising under federal copyright law"); EMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Lincoln, 691
So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the counterclaim because it involved rights arising out of the federal copyright laws and pied
copyright infringement."); Superior Clay Corp. v. Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n, 215 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ct.
Common Plea Ohio 1963); Pleatmaster v. Consol. Trimming Corp., 156 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1956); Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Norden Lab., Civ. A. No. 11615, 1992 WL 368604, *3
(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1992) (unpublished opinion).
222. Tewarson, 750 N.E.2d at 183.
223. Id.
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jurisdiction under § 1338(a), and, therefore, by operation of the statute,
no longer fall under a district court's exclusive jurisdiction. 224
The Indiana Supreme Court addressed the issue of exclusive federal
jurisdiction over copyright claims after the Holmes decision in Green v.
Hendrickson Publishers, Inc. 225 Hendrickson Publishers sued Mary and
Jay Green in Superior Court in Indiana for breach of a publishing
contract. 226 The Greens' counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, that
Hendrickson Publishers violated their copyrights on the books included
in the publishing contract.227 The Greens attempted to remove the case to
federal district court, but the federal court remanded "because a
defendant's counterclaim based on federal law does not confer federal
court jurisdiction. " 228 Hendrickson then argued that the Greens'
counterclaims, now amended, were preempted by federal copyright law
and the state court had no jurisdiction to decide them. 229 The trial court
agreed and granted partial summary judgment, but the court of appeals
reversed "holding that the copyright issues were merely tangential to the
contract claims, and the trial court had jurisdiction over the offending
portions of the counterclaim."230 The Indiana Supreme Court granted the
appeal and, in its opinion, noted that the appeal presented two issues:
"whether the Greens have a valid state law claim" and "what court may
entertain the Greens' claim. ,mi
In response to the first question, the Indiana Supreme Court
concluded that the Greens' counterclaim was preempted by federal
copyright law and therefore relief was available to the Greens only under
the federal Copyright Act. 232 This brought the Indiana Supreme Court to
the second question, the question on which the Holmes decision
impacts--can a state court hear a copyright counterclaim?233 The Indiana
Supreme Court noted that "until very recently the logic and language of
a consistent body of federal decisions appeared to preclude a state court

224. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
225. 770 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. 2002).
226. Id. at 787.
227. Id
228. Id See also, supra Part lll.B., where it is noted that this was already established law
before the Holmes decision.
229. Green, 770 N.E.2d at 787-88.
230. Id at 788 (citing Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 815, 824-25 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001)).
231. Id
232. Id at 790.
233. Id.
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from entertaining a counterclaim under copyright law."234 This body of
case law, in the Indiana Supreme Court's eyes, is now "trumped by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Holmes," opening the door for "a state court
[to] entertain a counterclaim under patent or copyright law." 235 The
Indiana Supreme Court noted that, under Holmes, a counterclaim does
not confer "arising under" jurisdiction under § 1338(a), and therefore,
counterclaims are not within the exclusive jurisdiction defined by
§ 1338(a).236 The Court, therefore, remanded the case to the trial court to
decide the copyright counterclaim.237
The Indiana Supreme Court decision gives a perfect example of the
impact the well-pleaded complaint rule can have on exclusive federal
jurisdiction over patent and copyright claims. If such claims are present
in only a counterclaim, and no other basis for removal is present, these
claims will stay in a state court's jurisdiction, with the Supreme Court
being their only avenue for federal review. 238
In contrast to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), other exclusive jurisdiction
statutes do not tie exclusivity to a district court's "arising under"
jurisdiction. Thus, these areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction are likely
not affected by the well-pleaded complaint rule. 239

234. Id. at 792 (discussing Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd.,
895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990) and the subsequent cases that interpreted district court "arising
under" jurisdiction in§ 1338(a) to include counterclaims).
235. Id. at 793.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 793-94.
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000).
239. For example, exclusive federal jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases is governed
by 28 U.S.C. § 1333. The statute states that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States,
of:
(I) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
(2) Any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings for the condemnation of
property taken as prize.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000). By not using the legally significant "arising under" phrase, the exclusive
jurisdiction over admiralty cases is not linguistically tied to the general decision of federal question
jurisdiction. Compare Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. 535 U.S. 826, 82932 (2002), with Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988) (noting
that the removal of actions against foreign states is removable while not using the "arising under"
language).
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PLACING FEDERAL LAW
COUNTERCLAIMS OUTSIDE THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT

The well-pleaded complaint rule places a universe of federal law
counterclaims outside federal jurisdiction. 240 A federal district court
cannot find an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction in a
counterclaim. 241 A defendant cannot remove a case from state court
based solely on a federal law counterclaim. 242 Furthermore, depending
on the statute governing federal exclusivity, a state court may be able to
exercise jurisdiction over what normally would be an exclusive federal
claim if the claim appears in a counterclaim. 243
The policy implications of the well-pleaded complaint rule as
applied to federal law counterclaims are many. First, the well-pleaded
complaint rule frustrates the purposes behind federal question
jurisdiction. Federal law counterclaims can get stuck in state court,
forcing federal claims to be tried before state judges. A defendant in
such a suit cannot call upon the expertise of a federal judge to decide the
federal counterclaim. By deciding such counterclaims, states frustrate
the inherent uniformity furthered by federal question jurisdiction.
Second, the legitimate interests of the parties may be frustrated by the
well-pleaded complaint rule's application to federal law counterclaims.
Both defendants and plaintiffs may, under certain circumstances, want,
and have legitimate reason to want, a federal law counterclaim to be
adjudicated in federal court. However, the well-pleaded complaint rule
may force such claims, potentially claims that normally fall within
exclusive federal jurisdiction, to be litigated in state court. Finally, by
preventing counterclaims from establishing federal question jurisdiction,
the well-pleaded complaint rule will lead to inefficiencies, particularly
where the rule prompts forum shopping and gamesmanship on the part
of plaintiffs and defendants. All three of these areas of policy concern
will be explored in detail below.
A. Frustrating the Purposes Behind Federal Question Jurisdiction
The original purpose behind federal question jurisdiction is
twofold: to address the fear of state hostility and bias against federal
laws and the need for uniformity in the application and interpretation of
240.
24 I.
242.
243.

See supra Part Il.C.
See supra Part Ill.8. I.
See supra Part IIl.8.2.
See supra Part IIl.8.3.
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federal law. 244 While concerns of state hostility against federal law may
now be unwarranted, 245 concerns for uniformity in the treatment of
federal law still ring true. The Supreme Court has recognized, on more
than one occasion, "the desirability of uniform decisions on federal
law. " 246 The more questions of federal law that are decided by federal
courts, the more likely there will be uniformity in decisions concerning
federal law. By allowing a particular forum-in this case the federal
court system-to have a monopoly on issues of federal law, a level of
doctrinal stability can be maintained. 247 While absolute doctrinal
stability is tough to achieve, minimizing the number of courts that
handle federal issues increases the chance for some level of
uniformity. 248 Furthermore, by limiting the number of courts deciding
federal questions, there is a potential for similarly situated litigants to be
treated the same or equally under the law. 249 The ability to achieve such
horizontal equality in federal cases becomes frustrated when the pool of
courts eligible to handle such issues expands to include all state
courts. 250
Perhaps more importantly than limiting the number of courts that
make decisions on federal law, federal question jurisdiction also puts
those federal question cases in the hands of courts who have the superior
expertise. 251 A federal court's experience with federal law increases the

244. Doemberg, supra note 29, at 647.
245. Merrell Dow Phann. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
246. Doemberg, supra note 29, at 648 (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 827-28 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
247. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing specialized courts). While Dreyfuss is
examining specialized courts-particularly the Federal Circuit-her analysis applies to the federal
court system because the federal system can be characterized as a specialized system, particularly in
comparison to the universe of all courts in the United States. Arguably, Dreyfuss's analysis
becomes a bit diluted when applied to the whole federal system, a system with such a large scale.
But her analysis still has some application to the purpose of uniformity furthered by federal question
jurisdiction.
248. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "while perfect
uniformity may not have been achieved [under§ 1331], experience indicates that the availability of
a federal forum in federal-question cases has done much to advance that goal").
249. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 8.
250. This can be compared to the creation of the Federal Circuit that decreased the number of
appellate courts that handled patent appeals from twelve to one in order to create "horizontal
equity." Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 8. While on a smaller scale, the same rationale applies to the
federal court system.
251. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (indicating that"§ 1331 has
provided for adjudication in a forum that specializes in federal law and that is therefore more likely
to apply that law correctly").
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likelihood the law will be applied correctly-a result in which all parties
to the suit, and the public, have an interest. 252 Federal courts, for
example, are skilled in interpreting federal statutes because they engage
in such interpretation in almost every case. 253 "[F]ederal question
jurisdiction is necessary ... to protect litigants relying on federal law
from the danger that state courts will not properly apply that law." 254
A state court, in contrast, does not see many questions of federal
law, and therefore is not versed or experienced in federal questions. 255
Most state courts simply cannot answer federal questions in the same
manner as federal courts, who see such issues at a higher frequency.
There is, however, the opportunity for federal review of state decisions
on federal law. 256 A party can apply for writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court from the final judgment of the "highest court of a
State" when the "validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
drawn in question." 257 Review, however, is unlikely given the "reality
that an extremely small percentage of the cases seeking Supreme Court
review actually receive it." 258 Therefore, the maintenance of a federal
district court's jurisdiction over federal questions plays a crucial role in
the enforcement of federal law.
The exclusion of certain cases from a federal district court's
jurisdiction due to the well-pleaded complaint rule frustrates the
purposes behind federal question jurisdiction-particularly the goal of
uniformity. The well-pleaded complaint rule forces certain federal law
counterclaims to fall outside a federal court's jurisdiction. 259 Neither
party to the suit can call upon the expertise of a federal court to
adjudicate these federal issues. When presented in a counterclaim, with
no other foundation for federal jurisdiction in the case, a question of
federal law lies outside of a district court's original jurisdiction and its
removal jurisdiction. 260 In cases such as Salton, the federal questions

252. Id. at 826-27; see also A.LI., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-65 (1969).
253. A.LI., supra note 252, at 165; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 71 ( 1980).
254. A.LI., supra note 252, at 168.
255. Id. at 165 (noting that "it is apparent that federal question cases must form a very small
part of the business of [state] courts .... ").
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000).
257. Id.
258. Doernberg, supra note 29, at 655.
259. See supra Part III.8.
260. See id.

40

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

will not stay within a federal district court's jurisdiction.261 Moreover, if
such a counterclaim appears in state court, the counterclaim does not
provide a basis for removal. 262
Perhaps even more frustrating to the purposes behind federal
question jurisdiction is the impact of the well-pleaded complaint rule on
areas of federal law in which Congress wanted exclusive federal
jurisdiction over a federal claim. 263 The Indiana Supreme Court's
decision in Green provides a good example of this frustration, where a
copyright counterclaim not only falls outside of federal jurisdiction, but
stays in state court to be adjudicated. 264 Congress, pursuant to § 1338(a),
wanted issues of patent and copyright law to be adjudicated by federal
courts. For this area of federal law, not only is there a policy interest of
federal uniformity and expertise in a copyright claim's adjudication,
there is a policy interest to not have the claim decided by a state court. 265
The well-pleaded complaint rule as applied to federal law counterclaims
frustrates these policy rationales. If the claim appears in a counterclaim,
it falls outside of this exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Arguably, a litigant wanting to have her federal law counterclaim
litigated in federal court can simply refile the counterclaim after the case
is dismissed from state court for want of jurisdiction. The federal claim
will now fall within the well-pleaded complaint and can qualify as an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.266 While this may be a
solution for some interested in federal uniformity and the use of the
federal judiciary's expertise, certain defendants could find themselves,
and their counterclaims, trapped in state court.
Take, as an example, a complaint filed in state court that forces a
defendant, based on the complaint's allegations, to file a compulsory
counterclaim. A plaintiff may assert state unfair competition claims in
state court that require a responding party to file federal patent or
copyright counterclaims. If, based on the facts surrounding the plaintiffs
complaint, such claims are compulsory under state rules of procedure,

261. Salton, Inc. v. Philips Domestic Appliances & Personal Care 8.V., No. 03 C 5660, 2004
WL 42371, at *5-7 (N.D. 111. Jan. 5, 2004).
262. See, e.g., Integra Bank, N.A. v. Greer, No. IP 4:02-CV-244 B/H, 2003 WL 21544260, at
*3-4 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2003).
263. See supra Part III.B.3.
264. Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc. 770 N.E.2d 784, 792-94 (Ind. 2002).
265. Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation ofJurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts
in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 635-36 (1971) (noting that federal courts were given
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases to promote uniformity in federal patent law).
266. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002).
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failure to assert such claims in state court will, depending on state law,
bar the defendant from presenting them in a future federal or state suit. 267
The defendant cannot remove the case to federal court because the
federal law counterclaims provide no basis for removal. 268
In addition, if such counterclaims are normally claims that fall
within a federal court's exclusive jurisdiction, the defendant may not be
able to get the counterclaims dismissed from state court for lack of
jurisdiction, depending on how exclusivity is defined. In the example
above, the state court can maintain jurisdiction over these compulsory
patent or copyright counterclaims. As the Indiana Supreme Court noted
in Green, since these claims appear in the form of a counterclaim, they
are not within the exclusive sphere of jurisdiction defined by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a). 269 The state court maintains jurisdiction over the compulsory
counterclaims the defendant had to assert in order not to waive them. As
a result, the claims are trapped in state court--even if the defendant
wanted them decided at the federal level.
Just as a defendant's counterclaims in the above example are
trapped in state court due to the well-pleaded complaint rule, a plaintiff
may also find herself trapped in state court in a situation where she
wants certain counterclaims adjudicated in federal court. The example
discussed above applies just as fully to the plaintiff, who, like the
defendant, cannot have the case removed or the counterclaims dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. Situations may also arise where, depending on
the state rules of procedure, a defendant may bring permissive
counterclaims in a state case. These counterclaims would not be
removable to the federal level to be decided. The only federal review
open to either of these parties, in the situations outlined above, is review
at the Supreme Court's discretion. 270
The above discussion is, admittedly, focused solely on the federal
interests at issue. There are also federalism concerns that should be
considered when deciding between a federal or state forum for a lawsuit.
"States have an obvious interest in enforcing state-created causes of
action in their own courts."271 The decision in Holmes was based, in part,

267. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp. v. Juster, 932 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (I Ith Cir.
1991); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379-383 (1985); 3 JAMES W.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 13.14[1] (3d ed. 2004).
268. See supra Part IILB.2.
269. Green, 770 N.E.2d at 793-94.
270. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000).
271. Collins, supra note 40, at 758.
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on observing these concerns. 272 This interest, however, must compete
with the federal government's interests in having federal claims, even
counterclaims, adjudicated in federal court. These federal interests
increase when the claim at issue is one traditionally within exclusive
federal jurisdiction. In addition, such federalism interests already take a
back seat when a plaintiffs complaint contains both federal and state
claims-with the whole case being eligible for removal. 273 Clearly
federal interests win out when such a case is removed based on the
complaint. It is hard to justify a different result when the claims raise
similar questions of federal law, but appear instead in counterclaims.
The examples set forth above demonstrate how the well-pleaded
complaint rule, when applied to exclude federal law counterclaims,
frustrates the policy rationale of uniformity behind federal question
jurisdiction. Both the plaintiff and the defendant may find themselves in
situations where they cannot avail themselves of federal expertise to
decide a federal law based counterclaim. Even more important, areas of
federal exclusivity, such as patent and copyright law, may be decided by
state courts. The need for uniformity and the use of federal expertise in
these areas of federal law is heightened, and the well-pleaded complaint
rule frustrates these policy goals.
B.

Hindering the Legitimate Interests of the Parties

In addition to frustrating the purposes behind federal question
jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint rule as applied to counterclaims
hinders the legitimate interests of the parties to a lawsuit. First, a
defendant with a counterclaim based on federal law has a legitimate
interest in having access to federal court. This interest is particularly
strong in a situation where the federal counterclaim is compulsory. If the
counterclaim is permissive, the defendant can simply file it as a
complaint in federal court. But, if the counterclaim is compulsory in the
state case, the defendant must present the claim or lose her ability to
assert the claim. 274 A defendant is forced to file the counterclaim-a
claim that could, absent the circumstances, have been filed in a
complaint and fallen within a federal court's jurisdiction. Just as the
272. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32 (2002).
273. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(c) (2000). The district court, in its discretion, may separate the state
claims and remand them. See id
274. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp. v. Juster, 932 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (!Ith Cir.
1991); Marrese v. Arn. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379-83 (1985); MOORE,
supra note 267, at§ 13.14 [l].
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defendant could have filed the claim as a complaint in federal court, a
defendant forced to bring a counterclaim has a legitimate interest in
having it adjudicated in federal court-to gain access to federal court's
expertise with the federal issue.
The plaintiff has a competing interest in having her state law claims
adjudicated in state court. Furthermore, the plaintiff is the master of the
complaint, and thus gains the ability to select the forum based on where
she files and what she alleges. 275 If she alleges only state claims and files
in state courts, there are equitable reasons to allow her selection of
forum to trump the interests of the defendant. 276 True, "[a] defendant
relying upon federal law to avoid a claim has just as great an interest in
vindication of federal law as does a plaintiff relying upon it to establish
his cause of action." 277 When comparing interests, however, a plaintiff's
interest in a state forum for her causes of action outweighs a defendant's
interest in her federal defenses. Put another way, interests in a claim, and
where it is adjudicated, trump those of a defense. This argument gains
further weight by the fact that the party asserting the claim, the plaintiff,
acted first and chose the forum.
The same analysis does not apply as readily when comparing a
plaintiff's claim and a defendant's counterclaim. The interest on the
defendant's side is not in a defense to a plaintiffs claim, but in an actual
claim. A defendant's interest in access to a federal tribunal for a claim,
as opposed to a defense, is higher. This interest grows more legitimate
when the counterclaim is compulsory. 278 Such a counterclaim is, in most
cases, foreseeable by the plaintiff since the claim arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence. In addition, because of its compulsory nature
and the doctrine of claim preclusion, the defendant does not have the
option of waiting and asserting the claim in a separate complaint in
federal court. Finally, if the claim normally would fall within a federal
court's exclusive jurisdiction, such as with patent and copyright claims

275. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 831-32; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987).
276. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399.
277. Doemberg, supra note 29, at 650.
278. A good argument can be made that permissive counterclaims should not be allowed to tip
the scales in the defendant's favor. Allowing a defendant to force federal jurisdiction over a plaintiff
by alleging any federal law counterclaim would upset the balance and frustrate the ability of a
plaintiff to be the master of her complaint. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 831-32. Compulsory counterclaims
present a different story, being prompted by the claims a plaintiff chooses to bring. Compulsory
counterclaims are out of the defendant's control, and therefore cannot be used to game the system
and illegitimately destroy the plaintiffs interests in the same way that a permissive counterclaim
can.
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under § 1338(a), the defendant's interest in having these claims resolved
in federal court are even higher, clearly outweighing the interests of the
plaintiff and, at the very least, justify the severing of the counterclaim
from the lawsuit.
There is another set of interests that must be explored-the
plaintiffs interests to have the federal law counterclaim adjudicated in
federal court. While the "expertise [of federal court] will often benefit
the party relying upon federal law, it also may benefit the party opposing
the assertion." 279 "[T]he federal courts' expertise may be as essential to a
party wishing to avoid an overbroad sweep of federal law as to one
seeking to avoid grudging indulgence of it." 280 A plaintiffs interest in a
federal forum is particularly heightened when the asserted federal law
comes in the form of a counterclaim, not simply a defense. The impact
of a state court decision on a claim has potentially broader implications
then a decision on a defense-the court may hold her liable under the
counterclaim, for example. A plaintiff, once a counterclaim is presented
in a case-either permissive or compulsory-may have a real interest in
moving the case to the federal level. 281
Therefore, both the plaintiff and the defendant have legitimate
interests to have a federal law counterclaim decided by a federal court.
The equities, under certain circumstances, dictate that the counterclaim
be adjudicated at the federal level. This is particularly true when
considering questions of federal law traditionally falling within the
federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction. The well-pleaded complaint rule
that prevents such counterclaims from forming the basis for removal
prohibits the exercising of these legitimate interests and any court's
recognition of the equities. In fact, in trying to protect the plaintiffs
ability to master the complaint and keep the case in state court, the wellpleaded complaint rule may be ignoring the plaintiffs own interests in
removing the case to federal court once a federal law counterclaim
appears in the suit. The well-pleaded complaint rule, as applied to
counterclaims, "operates blindly to preclude original federal jurisdiction

279. Doemberg, supra note 29, at 650.
280. Id.
281. The defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) is the only party that can seek removal.
See FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE, supra note 35, at § 3731. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot
exercise this interest in having the counterclaim adjudicated in state court. But, this does not negate
the fact that in some instances the plaintiffs and defendant's interests may align, and both parties
will want the case removed.
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in cases where, as a matter of sound policy, the parties ought to be
permitted to choose a federal forum." 282

C. Introducing Judicial Inefficiencies
The well-pleaded complaint rule was established to provide a
"quick rule of thumb" as to whether there was federal question
jurisdiction over a case. 283 By being able to focus solely on the plaintiffs
complaint, a court could easily, and efficiently, determine whether it had
"arising under" jurisdiction over the case. 284 In addition, the rule
"permits the determination of jurisdiction when the complaint is filed,
without awaiting the defendant's pleading."285 The Supreme Court's
decision in Holmes was based, in part, on the apparent efficiency
benefits to the well-pleaded complaint rule. 286 By "allowing responsive
pleadings by the defendant to establish 'arising under' jurisdiction," the
Court "would undermine the clarity and the ease of administration of the
well-pleaded-complaint doctrine .... " 287
While there may be some truth to the efficiency benefits of the
well-pleaded complaint rule, 288 the well-pleaded complaint rule as
applied to counterclaims introduces its own host of judicial
inefficiencies into both the federal and the state court system. These
inefficiencies outweigh any efficiency gains from excluding
counterclaims from the well-pleaded complaint. In addition, any benefits
to the judicial economy from the well-pleaded complaint rule must be
measured against the substantive implications discussed above.
The first inefficiency is exemplified by those cases in which, some
time after the filing of the lawsuit, a district court must dismiss a case for
want of subject matter jurisdiction, even though a federal law
counterclaim is present in the suit. Admittedly, this is black letter law
282. Cohen, supra note 10, at 894 (discussing the well-pleaded complaint rule's denial of
jurisdiction based on a federal defense).
283. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832 (2002)
(citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. I, 11 (1983).
284. Collins, supra note 41, at 757.
285. Cohen, supra note IO, at 894.
286. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 832.
287. Id.
288. A good argument can be made that forcing courts to look at responsive pleadings to
decide questions of jurisdiction does not produce any real judicial burden. "Making a jurisdictional
determination based on both parties' pleadings rather than on the plaintiff's alone would not ...
[add] significantly to the cost of that inquiry." Collins, supra note 41, at 757. Additionally, the
district court could also, for questions of removal, simply look to the defendant's petition for
removal for the existence of a federal question. Doemberg, supra note 29, at 653.
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with questions of jurisdiction-they may be raised at anytime and any
stage of the proceeding.289 The well-pleaded complaint rule creates such
dismissal situations not because the case lacks a federal question, but
because of where the federal question appears. Cases such as Salton
provide perfect examples of this type of inefficiency. 290 The apparent
indispensability of a third party, E & E, surfaced in that case, and the
district court was faced with the choice of joining E & E and losing
diversity and its jurisdiction or dismissing the case altogether. This
dismissal occurred even though the case included a federal law
counterclaim, concerning an exclusive area of federal law-copyright
law. 291 The court dismissed the case and, presumably, Salton, the
plaintiff, refiled in state court or Philips filed its counterclaims as part of
a complaint in federal court. If the district court was able to use Philips's
copyright counterclaim as an independent basis for jurisdiction, E & E
would have been joined and the case would have continued. Instead, the
well-pleaded complaint rule, by denying the district court the ability to
use the counterclaim as a foundation for original jurisdiction, introduced
the inefficiencies of dismissing the case and making the parties rush to
file in either state or federal court.
The inefficiencies of the well-pleaded complaint rule become
magnified if the case has already gone to judgment before the lack of
jurisdiction is recognized. This was the situation in Fax
Telecommunicaciones, where the case went to judgment before the
improper removal was recognized. 292 Instead of dismissing this already
tried case for lack of jurisdiction, erasing all of the work of the parties
and the district court, the Second Circuit found jurisdiction based on a
counterclaim that substantively arose under federal law. 293 The wellpleaded complaint rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Holmes
would require the court to dismiss this case, forcing the parties to refile
and retry the case. A district court followed the ruling in Fax
Telecommunicaciones, even after the Holmes decision, noting that "once
the 'district court has proceeded to final judgment, considerations of
finality, efficiency and economy become overwhelming, and federal

289. See, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 124 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (2004)
(noting that challenges to jurisdiction can be raised at any time prior to final judgment).
290. See generally Salton v. Philips Domestic Appliances & Personal Care B.V., No. 03 C
5660, 2004 WL 42371, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2004).
291. Id. at *6-7.
292. Fax Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 479, 485-86 (2d Cir. 1998).
293. Id. at 488.
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courts must salvage jurisdiction where possible. "'294 The district court
recognized the inefficiencies the well-pleaded complaint rule would
create if applied to the factual situation before it and how arbitrary a
dismissal would be simply because the federal claim appeared in a
defendant's pleading.
Inefficiencies will also manifest themselves through forum
shopping and gamesmanship on the part of litigants. A plaintiff has a
tool-the well-pleaded complaint rule-to trap a federal law
counterclaim in state court. As mentioned above, the plaintiff simply
files state law claims in state court that, based on the factual
underpinnings of the allegations, force compulsory federal law
counterclaims. 295 The defendant is forced to bring such federal law
counterclaims in state court or waive her rights to assert such claims. 296
The defendant cannot remove such claims to federal court because of the
well-pleaded complaint rule. 297 In reaction, or anticipation to these
tactics, a defendant may file her claims in another forum, converting her
counterclaims to a complaint in federal or state court. A race to the
courthouse will therefore ensue, with a potential defendant wanting to
file her counterclaims in a complaint to ensure federal jurisdiction. Even
if the race is lost, a defendant, now plaintiff in a possibly co-pending
case, may ask for consolidation of the cases or dismissal of the
plaintiffs case. This race and surrounding litigation gymnastics spring
from the jurisdictional situation created by the well-pleaded complaint
rule as applied to counterclaims. 298
Finally, the well-pleaded complaint as applied to counterclaims will
have a potentially negative effect on the federal judicial economy.
Arguably, since the rule limits a federal district court's original,
removal, and exclusive jurisdiction, the rule decreases the burden on the
federal court system. However, just as the number of federal cases is
limited, the number of state cases increases. More importantly, the
increase in caseload for state courts includes claims outside a state
court's area of expertise, requiring even more resources to bring such a
case to judgment or disposal. In addition, the only venue for federal
294. Wells Fargo Bank North v. Taca Int'! Airlines, 314 F. Supp. 2d 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting United Republic Ins. Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 170 (2d Cir. 2003)).
295. See supra Part III.B. l.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. This inefficiency is unique to the rule's application to counterclaims. Federal defenses, in
contrast to counterclaims, cannot be filed in a competing complaint. Thus, the forum shopping
described is unique to counterclaims.
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review of these cases is now the Supreme Court. 299 The Supreme Court
will likely be called upon to maintain some uniformity in the
interpretation of these federal issues, and therefore must become more
active in its review of state court decisions. 300 An increase in review by
the Supreme Court is a "costly use of federal resources even if fewer
cases overall [make] it into the federal system."301 And, if litigants
engage in the forum shopping using the well-pleaded complaint rule, the
rule as applied to counterclaims may mean a substantial workload for the
top of the federal judicial system.
V.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The detrimental effects of the well-pleaded complaint rule
discussed above are, at their base, extensions of arguments that have
already been made against the well-pleaded complaint rule as applied to
federal defenses. 302 However, the extent of the well-pleaded complaint's
impact on sound policy concerns becomes amplified when dealing with
a defendant's federal law counterclaims-particularly compulsory
counterclaims. While judicial solutions, such as reinterpreting the wellpleaded complaint rule or redefining statutory "arising under"
jurisdiction have been offered before, 303 the Holmes decision
demonstrates the Supreme Court's strict adherence to its test for "arising
under" jurisdiction. Therefore, a statutory solution should be
considered. 304
A potential statutory solution is to change the removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441, to allow parts of a defendant's pleading to vest a district
court with removal jurisdiction. 305 Section 1441 could be amended to
299. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000); see also Collins, supra note 41, at 759.
300. Collins, supra note 41, at 758. The Supreme Court's review is discretionary, but even
reviewing more writs for certiorari from these state cases with federal law counterclaims will
increase the Court's workload. Furthermore, the Court may feel obligated to review state court
decisions, particularly in areas of exclusive jurisdiction such as patent and copyright, since the
Court will be the only avenue for review of those decisions.
301. Id.
302. See generally Doernberg, supra note 29; Collins, supra note 41.
303. See Doernberg, supra note 29, at 656-69.
304. This author is not the first to discuss a statutory solution to the well-pleaded complaint
rule. See, A.LL, supra note 252, at 94-95. However, a solution tailored to the well-pleaded
complaint's impact on federal law counterclaims has not yet been investigated. Presumably, such a
tailored solution has not been considered because the issue was addressed by the Supreme Court for
the first time in Holmes.
305. Such an amendment could mimic the language of§ 144l(d) governing the removal of
actions against foreign states. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(d); see also Jonathan R. Nash, Pendant Party
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allow a district court to consider a defendant's counterclaim when
looking at a removal petition to determine whether these claims arise
under federal law. 306 Removal jurisdiction would be decoupled from
original jurisdiction, and a defendant would no longer be forced to
pursue her federal law counterclaim in state court.
However, a cleaner solution would be to amend the scope of the
district court's original jurisdiction to allow a federal law counterclaim
to form the basis of the court's jurisdiction. Then, the counterclaim
would both vest the district court with original jurisdiction and removal
jurisdiction. This would allow a district court to maintain jurisdiction in
situations such as those presented in Fax Telecommunicaciones and save
judicial resources. In additfon, allowing a defendant to remove a federal
law counterclaim preserves the defendant's interests and allows such a
claim to be litigated in a federal forum. The interests in having federal
claims decided in a federal forum will be preserved, providing an
increased opportunity for uniformity at the federal level. Finally,
allowing counterclaims to be considered for "arising under" jurisdiction
would also address any concerns regarding areas of exclusive federal
jurisdiction, such as with the patent and copyright jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a).
Any amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to include counterclaims as
part of the original federal jurisdiction analysis should take into account
whether it should limit this extension of jurisdiction to only compulsory
counterclaims. The potential for a defendant to hijack a plaintiffs choice
of forum is lowered if a statutory amendment is limited to compulsory
counterclaims. 307 In addition, the universe of counterclaims a defendant
could bring to force a lawsuit to become federal are limited by the
plaintiffs allegation. This would also bring a statutory amendment in
line with the concerns discussed by the Supreme Court in Holmes.
Finally, on a related point, serious consideration should be given to
amending the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional statute to decouple it from
basic "arising under" jurisdiction.308 By delinking the two, decisions
Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 16 B.U. lNT'L L. J. 71, 106-21 (1998)
(discussing§ 144l(d)).
306. A similar solution was offered by the ALI study in the 1960's. See id. at 25-29
(suggesting modifying § 1312 to allow removal for defendants who properly assert compulsory
counterclaims if the counterclaim sets forth a substantial federal claim); David P. Currie, The
Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 275 (1968).
307. See supra Part IV.A.
308. This was suggested by the author in an earlier article, albeit for a different purpose. See
Cotropia, supra note 4, at 306-09.
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such as Christianson and Holmes, that implicate questions unique to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and issues of patent law, will no
longer also address general questions of federal jurisdiction. Such an
amendment would allow courts, when dealing with questions of patent
appellate jurisdiction, to only deal with those specific questions and not
be concerned with, or perhaps oblivious to, the implications of their
decision on broader jurisdictional issues.
CONCLUSION

The aspect of the well-pleaded complaint rule discussed in the
Holmes decision affects more than just the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction over patent cases. The Supreme Court stated for the first
time in Holmes that counterclaims do not fall within the well-pleaded
complaint and therefore cannot form the basis for "arising under"
jurisdiction. The decision is a logical application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule. However, after examining the complete implications
such a rule has on a federal court's original, removal, and exclusive
jurisdiction over counterclaims, such an application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule should be rethought. The inability for cases whose only
federal law claim is presented in a counterclaim to be heard in a federal
forum frustrates both the purposes behind federal question jurisdiction
and the legitimate interests of all parties to the lawsuit. In addition, the
rule as applied to counterclaims introduces inefficiencies that outweigh
any reduction in judicial burdens from using this "quick rule of thumb."
The consequences of such a rule should force Congress and the courts to
reevaluate the well-pleaded complaint rule's application to federal law
counterclaims, particularly compulsory counterclaims.

